

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2545

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USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 10342

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DEPARTMENT PASS USIA WASHDC

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, US, XH

SUBJ: CSCE AND EASTERN EUROPE: SOME RANDOM THOUGHTS

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1. SUMMARY. HERewith ARE OUR THOUGHTS ON CURRENT MISCONCEPTIONS STEMMING FROM CSCE, ITS MAJOR BENEFIT TO US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, AND SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR OUR POLICY IN THE POST-CSCE PERIOD. END SUMMARY.

2. THERE IS A MYTH BEING PROPAGATED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE CSCE DOCUMENTS SOMEHOW CONFIRM THE STATUS QUO IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CONSOLIDATE SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE NATIONS OF THE AREA. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, OF COURSE, THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN BOUNDARIES WERE CONFIRMED BY THE VARIOUS FRG-EAST EUROPEAN TREATIES-- IF NOT BY THE CONQUERING SOVIET ARMIES IN 1944-45. AT MOST, THE CSCE LANGUAGE ON THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS SIMPLY PUTS THAT IDEA IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT. EVEN AT THAT, THE CAVEAT ON PEACEFUL CHANGE DILUTES THE CONCEPT OF THE PERMANENCY OF EASTERN EUROPEAN BORDERS TO THE POINT WHERE THE WEST GERMANS THEMSELVES NO LONGER OBJECT. AS FOR THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO, IT IS PRECISELY THIS THAT THE SOVIETS FEEL CSCE MAY UNHINGE THROUGH BASKET I ASSURANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND BASKET III EMPHASIS ON EAST-WEST CONTACTS. IN ANY CASE, WE WOULD FIND IT HARD TO SEE MERIT IN A LINE OF ARGUMENT IMPLYING ANY BENEFIT TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS FROM RAISING ONCE MORE THE HOARY BALKANESQUE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES THAT HAVE PLAGUED EUROPE FOR THE PAST TWO CENTURIES. IT IS TRUE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE ULTIMATE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY STILL HANGS OVER EUROPE LIKE A TIME BOMB--TICKING INEXORABLY, BUT SLOWLY AND FAR IN THE DISTANCE. HOWEVER, CSCE DOES NOT AFFECT THIS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

3. IN ANY EVENT, THE SOVIET POSITION AT HELSINKI AND THEIR OVERALL TREATMENT OF THE CSCE DOCUMENTS ARE FAIRLY PREDICTABLE. THE KREMLIN WILL TRUMPET THAT CSCE STEMMED PRIMARILY FROM BREZHNEV'S "PEACE PROGRAM" AND THE NEW "CORRELATION OF FORCES" IN THE WORLD AND HENCE IS A TRIUMPH FOR THE USSR AND FOR LEONID ILYCH PERSONALLY. UNDERLYING THIS CLAIM WILL BE A LEITMOTIF SUGGESTING THAT BREZHNEV HAS FINALLY ACHIEVED WHAT PETER THE GREAT AND THE VARIOUS SUCCEEDING RULERS OF RUSSIA COULD NOT--I.E., ACCEPTANCE OF

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THE USSR AS A FULL AND EQUAL VOICE IN MATTERS AFFECTING ALL OF EUROPE. THE SOVIETS WILL TEND TO PORTRAY THE CSCE DOCUMENTS AS MARKING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE. THEY MAY WELL ARGUE THAT COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD PLUS A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ARE NEXT IN PRIORITY IN MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY.

4. AS WE HAVE NOTED IN REFTTEL, WE EXPECT THAT DURING THE POST-CSCE PERIOD THE SOVIETS WILL WORK HARD TO BLUNT THE EFFECTS OF BASKET III BOTH IN THE USSR ITSELF AND IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL. KGB CHIEF ANDROPOV'S ELECTION SPEECH IN EARLY JUNE (MOSCOW 8097) DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY THAT THE KREMLIN WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO LIMITE THE CONSEQUENCES OF BASKET III FOR SOVIET SOCIETY AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THIS SAME CONCERN UNDOUBTEDLY EXTENDS TO ITS ALLIES, AND WE EXPECT AN EFFORT BY MOSCOW IN EASTERN EUROPE TO PROMOTE VIGILANCE CAMPAIGNS DESIGNED TO WARD OFF DESTABILIZING CONSEQUENCES OF THE CSCE OBLIGATIONS ON HUMAN CONTACTS.

5. WE BELIEVE OUR MAJOR ASSET FROM CSCE IS THAT DURING STAGE II THE TOPIC OF HUMAN CONTACTS ON ALL LEVELS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BECAME ESTABLISHED AS BEING AMENABLE TO EXAMINATION AND DIALOGUE IN AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONTEXT. ONE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT LONG-RANGE PURPOSE IN PROMOTING A POLICY OF DETENTE IS THE HOPE THAT BY DOING SO WE CAN HELP TO FOSTER A MORE HUMANE SOCIETY IN THE USSR, ONE THAT IS NOT OBSESSED WITH THE THREAT FROM THE WEST. THE VARIOUS LEVERS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO PROMOTE THIS AIM, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM, ARE MODEST AND LIMITED. BUT ONE IMPORTANT CHANNEL AVAILABLE TO US THROUGH WHICH TO INFLUENCE THE SOVIETS IS VIA THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THE SOVIETS INVADED CZECHOSLOVAKIA BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THEY COULD NOT ALLOW IN PRAGUE WHAT WAS IMPERMISSIBLE IN KIEV OR MOSCOW. HOWEVER, TIMES HAVE CHANGED SINCE 1968 AND DUBCEK, IN ANY CASE -- AND HOWEVER ADMIRABLE HIS ASPIRATIONS--PROVED TO BE A BUMBLING POLITICIAN. EVEN AT THAT TIME HAD HE MOVED IN A DIFFERENT FASHION HE MIGHT HAVE ACHIEVED HIS GOALS. BUT IT IS INCONTESTABLE THAT DEVELOPMENTS

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IN EASTERN EUROPE HAVE AN IMPORTANT, BUT OFTEN INDEFINABLE, EFFECT ON THE OUTLOOK OF SOVIET LEADERS. IT IS NOT UNREALISTIC, THEREFORE, TO THINK OF THIS AREA AS A CONDUIT OF SOCIAL CHANGE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE TRICK, OF COURSE, WILL BE TO INFLUENCE THE EAST EUROPEANS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WITHOUT BRINGING THE ARMED WRATH OF THE KREMLIN DOWN ON THEM.

6. WITH THE ABOVE IN MIND, AND TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION DOMESTIC SKEPTICISM REGARDING CSCE AS WELL, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS, BOTH LONG AND SHORT RANGE, WHICH U.S. POLICY-MAKERS MIGHT CONSIDER IN THE POST-CSCE PERIOD:

A. FIRST OF ALL, AS NOTED IN REFTTEL, WE FEEL

STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE SUPINE IN THE FACE OF SOVIET
EFFORTS TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF BASKET III. WE
THINK WE SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO CONVEY TO THE EUROPEANS,
INCLUDING THE USSR, THAT WE REGARD CSCE OBLIGATIONS AS
REAL GUIDEPOSTS TO FUTURE CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLES.

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O R 241506Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2546

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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B. WE SHOULD USE OUR OWN MEDIA TO EMPHASIZE THE CONTENT OF THESE OBLIGATIONS (E.G., DISCUSSION PROGRAMS ON VOA, BBC, DEUTSCHE WELLE, PERHAPS EVEN IN TANDEM; A COVER OF AMERIKA MAGAZINE SHOWING BREZHNEV AND FORD SIGNING CSCE CONFIDENTIAL

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DOCUMENTS, AND ARTICLES IN THAT ISSUE EXPLAINING OUR VIEWS AND PRACTICES REGARDING BASKET III AREAS).

C. (WE WOULD SUGGEST IN THE ABOVE REGARD THAT ONE OF OUR BETTER WORDSMITHS COIN A EUPHONIOUS SUBSTITUTE FOR "BASKE III"--E.G., THE EUROPEAN CHARTER OF HUMAN CONTACTS.

D. THE SOVIETS WILL BE EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF BASKET I IN THEIR MEDIA. WE SHOULD TAKE PAINS IN OUR OWN COMMENTARIES TO POINT OUT TO EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET AUDIENCES THE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE LANGUAGE OF BASKET I WITH REGARD TO SOVEREIGNTY, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, AND PROHIBITION OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS, PRESUMABLY INCLUDING SOCIALIST ONES.

E. IN VARIOUS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTARIES ON CSCE WE SHOULD ESCHEW MERE RHETORICAL TRIBUTE AND STRESS THAT OUR MAJOR CHALLENGE IS TO BRING THESE AGREEMENTS TO LIFE THROUGH CONCRETE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF ALL THE SIGNATORIES.

F. WE SHOULD ALSO IN OUR COMMENTARIES CALL ATTENTION TO THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN PHILOSOPHY AND WORLD OUTLOOK WHICH CONTINUE TO DIVIDE EUROPE, AND PERHAPS NOTE THAT THE UN CHARTER REMAINS THE DEFINITIVE SOURCE OF PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

G. WE SHOULD CONSCIOUSLY AND REPEATEDLY MAKE EFFORTS TO REFER TO THE CSCE DOCUMENTS, AND URGE OUR ALLIES TO DO THE SAME, IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS ON BILATERAL ISSUES SUCH AS DIVIDED FAMILIES, WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS, RADIO BROADCASTING, ETC.

H. WE SHOULD ALSO MAKE CRYSTAL-CLEAR THAT MBFR, NOT THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE OR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA, SHOULD BE NEXT ON THE MULTILATERAL AGENDA.

I. FINALLY, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT A CAREFUL EFFORT BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT TO MONITOR THE RECORD OF COMPLIANCE BY CSCE SIGNATORIES AND THAT SUCH A RECORD BE PUBLISHED REGULARLY, PERHAPS ON A SEMI-ANNUAL OR ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL

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BASIS.

6. BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE SUGGESTIONS PUT FORTH ABOVE, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT A BROAD STUDY BE UNDERTAKEN TO EXAMINE WHETHER WE ARE DOING THE UTMOST POSSIBLE AND GIVING THE WEIGHT IT DESERVES TO OUR RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE. OUR PRELIMINARY IMPRESSION IS THA MORE WAYS SHOULD BE FOUND TO EXPAND OUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE THERE. MORE VISITS BY AMERICAN LEADERS, SUCH AS THE CURRENT ONES BY THE PRESIDENT, WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD. PERHAPS EQUALLY IMPORTANT, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD EXAMINE SERIOUSLY WHETHER OUR MISSIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE ARE NOT NOW READY TO OPERATE UNDER NEW GUIDELINES IN THIS ERA OF DETENTE AND WHETER THEY ARE NOT UNDERSTAFFED, PARTICULARLY ON THE USIS AND POLITICAL SIDE, IF THEY ARE TO BE EXPECTED TO EXPAND CONTACTS AND INTERCHANGE OF IDEAS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS AND POPULATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF GREATER CONSULAR PRESENCE IN THE CITIES OF EASTERN EUROPE.

7. IN SUM, WE WOULD HOPE THAT FULL ADVANTAGE WILL BE TAKEN OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ADHERENCE TO THE CSCE DOCUMENTS. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT AS A RESULT OF THE CURRENT FOCUS ON CSCE, CONSIDERATION NOW BE GIVEN TO PERHAPS ASSIGNING GREATER PRIORITY TO U.S. POLICY AND EFFORTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. NOT ONLY IS IT AN AREA OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S., BOTH POLITICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY, BUT IT IS OF PERHAPS EQUAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE POTENTIAL EFFECT DEVELOPMENTS THERE CAN HAVE ON THE USSR ITSELF. STOESEL

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